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1 Platonism
Mathematical Platonism is the view that mathematical objects exist. Traditional Pla-
tonists believe that a world with no mathematical objects is consistent; subtle Platonists
believe that such a world would be inconsistent.
The easiest way of getting a handle on traditional Platonism is by imagining a creation
myth. On the first day God created light; by the sixth day, she had created a large and
complex world, including black holes, planets and sea-slugs. But there was something left
to be done. So on the seventh day she created mathematical objects. Only then did she
rest. On this view, it is easy to make sense of a world with no mathematical objects: it is
just like the world we are considering, except that God rested on the seventh day.
The crucial feature of this creation myth is that God needed to do something extra
in order to bring about the existence of mathematical objects: something that wasn’t
already in place when she created black holes, planets and sea-slugs. According to subtle
Platonists, this is a mistake. A subtle Platonist believes that for the number of the Fs
to be eight just is for there to be eight planets. So when God created eight planets she
thereby made it the case that the number of the planets was eight. More generally, subtle
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Platonists believe that a world without numbers is inconsistent. Suppose, for reductio,
that there are no numbers. The subtle Platonist thinks that for the number of numbers
to be zero just is for there to be no numbers. So the number zero must exist after all,
contradicting our assumption.
Essential to the subtle Platonist’s position is the acceptance of ‘just is’-statements. For
instance:
For the number of the planets to be eight just is for there to be eight planets.
[In symbols: #x(Planet(x)) = 8 ≡ ∃!8x(Planet(x)).]
This is the sense of ‘just is’ whereby most of us would wish to claim that for something to
be composed of water just is for it to be composed of H2O [i.e. Water(x) ≡x H2O(x)], and
that for two people to be siblings just is for them to share a parent [i.e. Siblings(x, y) ≡x,y
∃z(Parent(z, x) ∧ Parent(z, y))]. It is also the sense of ‘just is’ whereby some philosophers
(but not all) would wish to claim that for a wedding to take place just is for someone to
get married [i.e. ∃x(Wedding(x) ∧ TakesPlace(x)) ≡ ∃x(Married(x))], or that for there to
be a table just is for there to be some particles arranged table-wise [i.e. ∃x(Table(x)) ≡
∃X(ArrTw(X))].
‘Just is’-statements are to be understood as ‘no difference’-statements. ‘For a wedding
to take place just is for someone to get married’ should be treated as expressing the same
thought as ‘There is no difference between a wedding’s taking place and someone’s getting
married’. Accordingly, I will understand the ‘just is’ operator ‘≡’ as reflexive, transitive
and symmetric.
One might be tempted to think of ‘just is’-statements as expressing identities amongst
facts, or identities amongst properties. (The fact that a wedding took place is identical to
the fact that someone got married; the property of being composed of water is identical to
the property of being composed of H2O.) I have no qualms with this way of putting things,
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as long as fact-talk and property-talk are understood in a suitably deflationary way. (For
the fact that snow is white to obtain just is for snow to be white; to have the property of
being round just is to be round.) But it is important to keep in mind that fact-talk and
property-talk are potentially misleading. They might be taken to suggest that one should
only accept a ‘just is’-statement if one is prepared to countenance a na¨ıve realism about
facts or about properties—the view that even though it is consistent that there be no facts
or properties, we are lucky enough to have them. The truth of a ‘just is’-statement, as it
will be understood here, is totally independent of such a view.
‘Just is’-statements pervade our pre-theoretic, scientific and philosophical discourse.
Yet they have been given surprisingly little attention in the literature, and are in much
need of elucidation. I think it would be hopeless to attempt an explicit definition of ‘≡’,
not because true and illuminating equivalences couldn’t be found—I will suggest some
below—but because any potential definiens can be expected to contain expressions that
are in at least as much need of elucidation as ‘≡’. The right methodology, it seems to
me, is to explain how our acceptance of ‘just is’-statements interacts with the rest of our
theorizing, and use these interconnections to inform our understanding of ‘≡’. (I make no
claims about conceptual priority: the various interconnections I will discuss are as well-
placed to inform our understanding of ‘≡’ on the basis of other notions as they are to
inform our understanding of the other notions on the basis of ‘≡’.)
1.1 ‘Just is’-Statements
In this section I will suggest three different ways in which our acceptance of ‘just is’-
statements interacts with the rest of our theorizing. (I develop these connections in greater
detail in Rayo (typescript).)
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1.1.1 Inconsistency
Say that a representation is inconsistent if it represents the world as being inconsistent.
The following sentence is inconsistent, in this sense:
There is something that is composed of water but is not composed of H2O.
For to be composed of water just is to be composed of H2O. So a world in which something
composed of water fails to be composed of H2O is a world in which something composed
of water fails to be composed of water, which is inconsistent.
There is a different notion that won’t be of interest here but is worth mentioning
because it is easily conflated with inconsistency. Say that a representation is conceptually
inconsistent if (a) it is inconsistent (b) if its inconsistency is guaranteed by the concepts
employed (plus semantic structure). In the example above, there is no reason to think that
the relevant concepts (plus semantic structure) guarantee that the sentence represents the
world as being inconsistent. So there is no reason to think that we have a case of conceptual
inconsistency. But consider:
There is something that is composed of water but is not composed of water.
This sentence is inconsistent for the same reason as before: it depicts the world as being
such that something composed of water fails to be composed of water, which is inconsistent.
But in this case it is natural to think that the meanings of relevant terms (plus semantic
structure) guarantee that the world will be represented as inconsistent, in which case one
will wish to count the sentence as conceptually inconsistent.
I would like to suggest is that there is a tight connection between the notion of incon-
sistency and ‘just is’-statements:
A first-order sentence (or set of first-order sentences) is inconsistent if and only
if it is logically inconsistent with the true ‘just is’-statements.
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The connection between consistency and ‘just is’-statements places constraints on the ‘just
is’ operator. It suggests that the role of ‘just is’-statements is very different from the role
of other sentences. A sentence like ‘snow is white’ represents the world as being such that
snow is white, and in doing so rules out a consistent way for the world to be (namely:
such that snow is not white). A true ‘just is’-statement, in contrast, does not rule out a
consistent way for the world to be. What it does instead is identify the limits of consistency.
Consider ‘to be composed of water just is to be composed of H2O’. This statement
represents the world as satisfying a certain condition: that of being such that there is no
difference between being composed of water and being composed of H2O. But the statement
is true: it is indeed the case that to be composed of water just is to be composed of
H2O (or so we may suppose). So the condition in question is just the condition of being
such that there is no difference between being composed of water and being composed
of water—something that cannot consistently fail to be satisfied. The result is that—
unlike the case of ‘snow is white’, say—our ‘just is’-statement fails to rule out a consistent
way for the world to be. It does, however, tell us something important about the limits
of consistency. It entails that a scenario whereby something is composed of water but
not H2O is inconsistent. And to succeed in so delineating the limits of consistency is a
non-trivial cognitive accomplishment.
1.1.2 Truth-conditions
A sentence’s truth-conditions are usefully thought of as consisting of a requirement on the
world—the requirement that the world would have to satisfy in order to be as the sentence
represents it to be. The truth-conditions of ‘snow is white’, for example, consist of the
requirement that snow be white, since that is how the world would have to be in order to
be as ‘snow is white’ represents it to be.
Two sentences might have the same truth-conditions even if they have different mean-
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ings (in a pre-thoeretic sense of ‘meaning’). Consider ‘the glass contains water’ and ‘the
glass contains H2O’. These two sentences play very different roles in our linguistic practice,
so it is natural to describe them as meaning different things. But one should still think
that the two sentences have the same truth-conditions. For to be composed of water just
is to be H2O. So there is no difference between what would be required of the world in
order to be as ‘the glass contains water’ represents it to be and what would be required of
the world in order to be as ‘the glass contains H2O’ represents it to be.
I would like to suggest that there is a tight connection between ‘just is’-statements and
the notion of sameness of truth-conditions:
The first-order sentences φ and ψ have the same truth-conditions if and only if
pfor it to be the case that φ just is for it to be the case that ψq is true.
Suppose, for example, that you think that for A to be composed of water just is for A
to be composed of H2O. Then you should think that ‘A is composed of water’ and ‘A is
composed of H2O’ have the same truth-conditions. For what the former requires of the
world is that A be composed of water. But to be composed of water just is to be composed
of H2O, which is what the latter requires of the world. Conversely: suppose you think ‘A
is composed of water’ and ‘A is composed of H2O’ have the same truth-conditions. Then
you think there is no difference between satisfying the requirement that A be composed
of water and satisfying the requirement that A be composed of H2O. You should think, in
other words, that for A to be composed of water just is for A to be composed of H2O.
1.1.3 Metaphysical Possibility
The use of ‘metaphysical’ in ‘metaphysical possibility’ lends itself to two very different
readings. (See Rosen (2006) for illuminating discussion.)
On one reading, ‘metaphysical’ is used as a way of indicating the level of strictness
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that is to be employed when talking about possibility. Thus, the notion of metaphysical
possibility might be thought of as stricter than the notion of conceptual possibility but
less strict than the notion of physical possibility. Kment (2006), for example, suggests
that we replace “the concept of a possible world with the wider, non-modal notion of a
world. Worlds [...] comprise both possible and impossible worlds [and] are ordered by
their closeness to the actual world [...] [F]or a proposition to be metaphysically necessary
is for it to be true in every world that has at least a certain degree of closeness to the
actual world.” (pp.6–7). Nomological and conceptual possibility are said to work the same
way, but with standards of closeness that are more or less strict. (A proponent of this
sort of view need not think that metaphysical possibility captures a level of strictness that
is philosophically significant. Cameron (2010) and Sider (typescript), for example, argue
that there’s nothing special about the relevant level of strictness: nothing important would
be lost if it had been drawn elsewhere.)
On a different way of reading ‘metaphysical’ in ‘metaphysical possibility’, its role is to
determine a type of possibility, rather than a level of strictness. It is meant to distinguish be-
tween possibility de mundo and possibility de representatione. The difference, informally, is
that whereas possibility de representatione is a property of sentences, possibility de mundo
is a property of the truth-conditions expressed by such sentences. (Logical consistency, for
instance, is a notion of possibility de representatione since ‘Hesperus 6= Phosphorus’ and
‘Hesperus 6= Hesperus’ differ in terms of logical consistency, even though satisfaction of
their truth-conditions imposes the same impossible requirement on the world.) Somewhat
more precisely, one might say that whereas possibility de mundo applies to ways for the
world to be regardless of how they happen to be represented, possibility de representatione
is sensitive to how ways for the world to be happen to be represented.
On this way of seeing things, the role of ‘metaphysical’ in ‘metaphysical possibility’ is to
clarify that the notion of possibility in question is to be thought of as a form of possibility
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de mundo, rather than a form of possibility de representatione. The thought, then, is that
metaphysical possibility is the most inclusive form of possibility de mundo there is. Going
beyond metaphysical possibility is not a matter of going beyond a given limit of strictness:
it is a matter of lapsing into inconsistency.
I would like to suggest that there is a tight connection between ‘just is’-statements and
the notion of metaphysical possibility so understood:
A first-order sentence (or set of first-order sentences) describes a metaphysically
possible scenario just in case it is logically consistent with the set of true ‘just
is’-statements.
Relatedly,
A ‘just is’-statement pφ(~x) ≡~x ψ(~x)q is true just in case the corresponding
modal statement p∀~x(φ(~x)↔ ψ(~x))q is true.
So many philosophers have said so many different things about the notion of metaphysical
possibility—and so much about the notion is poorly understood—that there are limits to
how much light can be shed on the ‘just is’-operator by defining it in terms of metaphysical
possibility. It is better to think of the above connections as a two-way street: they use
the notion of metaphysical possibility to help explain how the ‘just is’-operator should
be understood, but they also use the ‘just is’-operator to help explain how the notion of
metaphysical possibility should be understood. Neither of the two notions is being defined
in terms of the other, but getting clear about how they are related is a way of shedding
light on both.
1.2 The Resulting Picture
In the preceding section I suggested several different ways in which our acceptance of ‘just
is’-statements interacts with the rest of our theorizing. In doing so, I hope to have shown
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that ‘just is’-statements are at the center of our theorizing about consistency, content and
metaphysical possibility. The aim of the present section is to make some brief remarks
about the philosophical picture that emerges from these theoretical connections.
In theorizing about the world, we do three things at once. First, we develop a language
within which to formulate theoretical questions. Second, we endorse a family of ‘just is’-
statements, and thereby classify the questions that can be formulated in the language into
those we take to be worth answering and those we regard as pointless, at least for the time
being. (For instance, by accepting ‘to be composed of water just is to be composed of
H2O’, we resolve that ‘why does this portion of water contain hydrogen?’ is not the sort of
question that is worth answering; had we instead accepted ‘to be composed of water just
is to be an odorless, colorless liquid with thus-and-such properties’, we would have taken
‘why does this portion of water contain hydrogen?’ to be an interesting question, deserving
explanation.) Third, we set forth theoretical claims that address the questions we take to
be worth answering. (For instance, having accepted ‘to be composed of water just is to
be composed of H2O’, we set forth theoretical claims as an answer to the question ‘why is
this portion of water an odorless, colorless liquid with thus-and-such properties?’.)
In light of the connection between ‘just is’-statements and possibility, when one en-
dorses a set of ‘just is’-statements one is, in effect, endorsing a space of possible worlds.
And in light of the connection between possibility and consistency, a space of possible
words can be regarded as a framework for ascertaining the limits of consistency. In other
words: by endorsing a set of ‘just is’-statements one is, in effect, endorsing a framework
for ascertaining the limits of consistency
It is against the background of such a framework that it makes sense to distinguish
between ‘factual sentences’—i.e. sentences that are verified by some consistent scenarios
but not others—and ‘necessary truths’—i.e. sentences that are verified in every consistent
scenario. What one gets is a post-Quinean revival of the position that Carnap advanced
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in ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’. Carnap’s frameworks, like ours, are devices for
distinguishing between factual sentences and necessary truths. The big difference is that
whereas Carnap’s distinction was tied up with the analytic/synthetic distinction, ours is
not.
1.3 Back to Platonism
I introduced the difference between traditional and subtle Platonism by saying that whereas
traditional Platonists believe that a world with no mathematical objects is consistent,
subtle Platonists think one cannot. But if one is prepared to embrace a tight connection
between possibility and consistency, as I suggested above, one can also state the difference
as follows: traditional Platonists believe that mathematical objects exist contingently;
subtle Platonists believe that they exist necessarily.
This way of characterizing the debate might strike you as suspect. If so, it may be
because you have a different conception of possibility in mind. In the sense of necessity
that is at issue here, the claim that numbers exist necessarily entails that the existence
of numbers is no longer a factual question: nothing is required of the world in order
for the truth-conditions of a truth of pure mathematics to be satisfied. Satisfaction is
guaranteed by the framework with respect to which we have chosen to carry out our
theoretical investigation of the world.
Non-factuality, in our sense, does not entail a priori knowability. (‘To be composed
of water just is to be composed of H2O’ will count as non-factual even though it is not
knowable a priori.) But there is still room for mathematical truths to enjoy a distinct
epistemological status. For in adopting a framework—i.e. in adopting a family of ‘just is’-
statements—one makes decisions that are closely tied to empirical considerations, but also
decisions that are more organizational in nature. This is because a delicate balance must
be struck. If one accepts too many ‘just is’-statements, one will be committed to treating
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as inconsistent scenarios that might have been useful in theorizing about the world. If one
accepts too few, one opens the door to a larger range of consistent scenarios, all of them
candidates for truth. In discriminating amongst these scenarios one will have to explain
why one favors the ones one favors. And although the relevant explanations could lead to
fruitful theorizing, they could also prove burdensome.
Logic and mathematics play an important role in finding the right balance between
these competing considerations. Take, for example, the decision to treat ‘p ↔ ¬¬p’ as
a logical truth (i.e. the decision to accept every ‘just is’-statement of the form ‘for p to
be the case just is for ¬¬p to be the case’). A friend of intuitionistic logic, who denies
the logicality of ‘p ↔ ¬¬p’, thinks it might be worthwhile to ask why it is the case that
p even if you fully understand why it is not the case that ¬p. In the best case scenario,
making room for an answer will lead to fruitful theorizing. But things may not go that
well. One might come to see the newfound conceptual space between a sentence and its
double negation as a pointless distraction, demanding explanations in places where there
is nothing fruitful to be said.
The result is that even if none of the decisions one makes in adopting a family of
‘just is’-statements is wholly independent of empirical considerations, some decisions are
more closely tied to empirical considerations than others. And when it comes to ‘just is’-
statements corresponding to logic and mathematics, one would expect the focus to be less
on particular empirical matters and more on questions of framework-organization. So there
is room for a picture whereby an epistemically responsible subject can believe that numbers
exist even if her belief isn’t grounded very directly in any sort of empirical investigation.
2 Neo-Fregeanism
Hume’s Principle is the following sentence:
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∀F∀G(#x(F (x)) = #x(G(x))↔ F (x) ≈x G(x))
[Read: the number of the Fs equals the number of the Gs just in case the Fs
are in one-one correspondence with the Gs.]
Neo-Fregeanism is the view that when Hume’s Principle is set forth as an implicit definition
of ‘#x(F (x))’, one gets the following two results: (1) the truth of Hume’s Principle is know-
able a priori, and (2) the referents of number-terms constitute a realm of mind-independent
objects which is such as to render mathematical Platonism true. (Neo-Fregeanism was first
proposed in Wright (1983), and has since been championed by Bob Hale, Crispin Wright
and others. For a collection of relevant essays, see Hale and Wright (2001).)
Just as one can distinguish between two different varieties of mathematical Platonism,
one can distinguish between two different varieties of neo-Fregeanism. Traditional and
subtle neo-Fregeanism agree that numbers—the referents of numerical-terms—constitute a
realm of mind-independent objects. But they disagree about whether this realm of objects
can consistently fail to exist.
Subtle neo-Fregeans go beyond mere acceptance of Hume’s Principle; they accept a
‘just is’-statement corresponding to Hume’s Principle:
#x(F (x)) = #x(G(x)) ≡F,G F (x) ≈x G(x)
[Read: for the number of the Fs to equal the number of the Gs just is for the
Fs to be in one-one correspondence with the Gs.]
A consequence of this ‘just is’-statement is that it is inconsisntent that there be no numbers.
For it is trivially true that, e.g. the planets are in one-one correspondence with themselves.
But for the planets to be in one-one correspondence with themselves just is for the number
of the planets to be self-identitcal. So numbers exist after all.
Traditional neo-Fregeans, in contrast, accept Hume’s Principle, but shy away from
accepting the corresponding ‘just is’-statement. Accordingly, they take themselves to be
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able to make sense of a world with no numbers.
It seems to me that there is some confusion in the literature about which of the
two version of the neo-Freganism is being discussed. Critics of neo-Fregeanism have
sometimes interpreted the program as a version of traditional neo-Fregeanism—the au-
thor of Rayo (2003) and Rayo (2005), for instance. (For a survey of the literature, see
MacBride (2003).) But it is not clear that this is what proponents of neo-Fregeanism have
in mind. There are strong indications that the subtle variety is closer to the mark. One
such indication is the use of ‘neo-Fregeanism’ as a name for the program—for there is good
reason to think that Frege himself was a proponent of subtle Platonism.
When Frege claims, for example, that the sentence ‘there is at least one square root of
4’ expresses the same thought as ‘the concept square root of 4 is realized’, and adds that
“a thought can be split up in many ways, so that now one thing, now another, appears as
subject or predicate” (Frege (1892) p. 199), it is natural to interpret him as embracing the
‘just is’-statement:
For the concept square root of 4 to be realized just is for there to be at least
one square root of 4.
And when he claims, in Grundlagen §64, that in treating the judgement ‘line a is parallel
to line b’ as a ‘just is’-statement, so as to obtain ‘the direction of line a is identical to the
direction of line b’, we “carve up the content in a way different from the original way”, it
is natural to interpret him as embracing the ‘just is’-statement:
For the direction of line a to equal the direction of line b just is for a and b to
be parallel.
In both instances, Frege puts the point in terms of content-recarving, rather than as a ‘just
is’-statement. But, as emphasized above, one’s views about truth-conditions are tightly
correlated with the ‘just is’-statements one accepts.
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Neo-Fregeans are evidently sympathetic towards Frege’s views on content-recarving.
(See, for instance, Wright (1997).) And even though talk of content-recarving has become
less prevalent in recent years, with more of the emphasis on implicit definitions, a version
of neo-Fregeanism rooted in subtle Platonism is clearly on the cards. In the remainder
of the paper I will argue that such an interpretation of the program would be decidedly
advantageous.
2.1 Objects
Suppose you introduce the verb ‘to tableize’ into your language, and accept ‘for it to
tableize just is for there to be a table’ (where the ‘it’ in ‘it tableizes’ is assumed to play
the same dummy role as the ‘it’ in ‘it is raining’). Then you will think that ‘it tableizes’
and ‘there is a table’ have the same truth-conditions. In each case, what is required in
order for the truth-conditions to be satisfied is that there be a table (equivalently: that
it tableize). So you will think that—for the purposes of stating that there is a table—
object-talk is optional. One can state that there is a table by employing a quantifier that
binds singular term positions—as in ‘there is a table’—but also by employing an essentially
different syntactic structure—as in ‘it tableizes’.
If object-talk is optional, what is the point of giving it a place in our language? Accord-
ing to compositionalism, as I shall call it, the answer is “compositionality”. A language
involving object-talk—that is, a language including singular terms and quantifiers binding
singular term positions—is attractive because it enables one to give a recursive specifica-
tion of truth-conditions for a class of sentences rich in expressive power. But there is not
much more to be said on its behalf. If one could construct a language that never indulged
in object-talk, and was able to do so without sacrificing compositionality or expressive
power, there would be no immediate reason to think it inferior to our own. Whether or
not we choose to adopt it should turn entirely on matters of convenience. (For an example
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of such a language, and illuminating discussion, see Burgess (2005).)
Proponents of the compositionalism believe that it takes very little for a singular term t
to refer. All it takes is an assignment of truth-conditions to whichever sentences involving
t one wishes to make available for use with the following two features: (1) the assignment
respects compositionality in the sense that if ψ is a syntactic consequence of φ then the
truth conditions assigned to φ are strictly stronger than the truth conditions assigned to
ψ; and (2) the world is such as to satisfy the truth-conditions that have been associated
with ‘∃x(x = t)’.
The reason there is nothing more that needs to be done is that there was nothing special
about using singular terms to begin with. In setting forth a language, all we wanted was
the ability to express a suitably rich range of truth-conditions. If we happened to carry
out this aim by bringing in singular terms, it was because they supplied a convenient way
of specifying the right range of truth-conditions, not because they had some further virtue.
Proponents of Tractarianism, as I shall call the opposing view, believe that object-
talk is subject to a further constraint: there needs to be a certain kind of correspondence
between the semantic structure of our sentences and the ‘metaphysical structure of reality’.
In particular, they presuppose the following: (1) there is a particular carving of reality
into objects which is more apt, in some metaphysical sense, than any potential rival—
the one and only carving that is in accord with reality’s true metaphysical structure;
(2) to each legitimate singular term there must correspond an object carved out by this
metaphysical structure; and (3) satisfaction of the truth-conditions of a sentence of the
form pP (t1, . . . , tn)q requires that the objects paired with t1, . . . , tn bear to each other the
property expressed by P .
A consequence of Tractarianism is that one cannot accept ‘for it to tableize just is for
there to be a table’. (Since ‘it tableizes’ and ‘there is a table’ have different semantic
structures, there can’t be a single feature of reality they are both accurate descriptions of
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when it is presupposed that correspondence with the one and only structure of reality is a
precondition for accuracy.) For similar reasons, one cannot accept ‘for some things to be
arranged tablewise just is for there to be a table’, or ‘for the property of tablehood to be
instantiated just is for there to be a table’, or, indeed, any ‘just is’ statement pφ ≡ ψq where
φ and ψ are atomic sentences with different semantic structures. Accordingly, Tractarians
takes themselves to be in a position to make distinctions that a compositionalist would fail
to make room for. For instance, they might take themselves to be in a position to make
sense of a scenario in which some things are arranged tablewise but there is no table.
I am ignoring a complication. Tractarians might favor a moderate version of the pro-
posal according to which only a subset of our discourse is subject to the constraint that
there be a correspondence between semantic structure and the metaphysical structure of
reality. (See, for instance, Sider (typescript).) One could claim, for example, that the
constraint only applies when one is in the ‘ontology room’. Accordingly, friends of the
moderate view would be free to accept a version of, e.g. ‘for there to be some things ar-
ranged tablewise just is for there to be a table’ by arguing that only ‘there are some things
arranged tablewise’ is to be understood in an ontology-room spirit. I will not be concerned
with moderate Tractarianism here.
The difference between compositionalism and (non-moderate) Tractarianism is subtle
but important. For compositionalism leaves room for meaninglessness where Tractarianism
does not. Suppose it is agreed on all sides that the singular terms t1 and t2 both have
referents, and figure meaningfully in sentences with well-defined truth-conditions. A Trac-
tarian is, on the face of it, committed to the claim that it must be possible to meaningfully
ask whether pt1 = t2q is true. For she believes that each of t1 and t2 is paired with one of
the objects carved out by the metaphysical structure of reality. So the question whether
pt1 = t2q is true can be cashed out as the question whether t1 and t2 are paired with the
same such object. (Tractarians could, of course, deny that this is a meaningful question.
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But such a move would come at a cost, since it it would make it hard to understand what
is meant by ‘carving reality into objects’.)
For a compositionalist, in contrast, there is no tension between thinking that t1 and
t2 have referents (and figure meaningfully in sentences with well-defined truth conditions),
and denying that one has asked a meaningful question when one asks whether pt1 = t2q is
true. For according to the compositionalist, all it takes for a singular term to be in good
order is for there to be a suitable specification of truth-conditions for whichever sentences
involving the term one wishes to make available for use. And there is no reason one couldn’t
have a suitable specification of truth-conditions for a large range of sentences involving t1
and t2 without thereby specifying truth-conditions for pt1 = t2q.
Arithmetic is a case in point. The subtle Platonist has a straightforward way of spec-
ifying the right sort of assignment of truth-conditions to arithmetical sentences. (See ap-
pendix A.) On this assignment, every arithmetical sentence a non-philosopher would care
about gets well-defined truth-conditions, as does every sentence in the non-arithmetical
fragment of the language. But no truth-conditions are supplied for mixed identity-statements,
such as ‘the number of the planets = Julius Caesar’. And for good reason: there is no
natural way of extending the relevant semantic clauses to cover these cases.
Tractarians will claim that something important has been left out. For in the absence of
well-defined truth-conditions for ‘the number of the planets = Julius Caesar’, it is unclear
which of the objects carved out by the metaphysical structure of reality has been paired
with ‘the number of the planets’. But compositionalists would disagree: it is simply a
mistake to think that such pairings are necessary to render a singular term meaningful.
“If compositionalism is right”—you might be tempted to ask—“in what sense are we
committed to the existence of numbers when we say that the number of the planets is
eight?” In the usual sense, say I. In order for the truth-conditions of ‘the number of the
planets is eight’ to be satisfied the number of the planets must be eight, and in order for
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the number of the planets to be eight there have to be numbers. What else could it take for
someone who asserts ‘the number of the planets is eight’ to be committed to the existence
of numbers?
Of course, the subtle Platonist will make a further claim. She will claim that it is also
true that all it takes for the truth-conditions of ‘the number of the planets is eight’ to be
satisfied is that there be eight planets. To think that this contradicts what was said in
the preceding paragraph is to fail to take seriously the idea that for the number of the
planets to be eight just is for there to be eight planets. It is true that ‘the number of
the planets is eight’ carries commitment to numbers, but it is also true that commitment
to numbers is no commitment at all. (If you have trouble getting your head around this,
consider the following. The subtle Platonist accepts ‘For the number of the planets to be
zero just is for there to be no planets’. She also accepts ‘For the number of the planets to
be distinct from zero just is for there to be planets’. Putting the two together, she accepts
‘For the number of planets to be either identical to or distinct from zero just is for there
to be some planets or none’; equivalently: ‘For the number of the planets to exist just is
for there to be some planets or none’. But ‘there are some planets or none’ has trivial
truth-conditions—truth-conditions whose non-satisfaction would be inconsistent—so ‘the
number of the planets exists’ must also have trivial truth-conditions.)
The moral I hope to draw from the discussion this section is that subtle Platonists have
reason to embrace compositionalism. This goes, in particular, for subtle neo-Fregeans—
neo-Fregeans who favor subtle Platonism. But once one embraces compositionalism, there
is no pressure for thinking that a mixed identity-statement such as ‘the number of the
planets = Julius Caesar’ should have well-defined truth-conditions. So there is no reason
to think—in spite of what Frege suggests in §66 of the Grundlagen and what proponents of
neo-Fregeanism tend to presuppose—that a characterization of the concept of number will
be unacceptable unless it settles the truth-value of mixed identity-statements. In short: if
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you are a subtle neo-Fregean, you should be resolute about it, and stop worrying about
mixed identities.
2.2 Abstraction Principles
I have never been able to understand why a traditional neo-Fregean would think it impor-
tant to use Hume’s Princple to characterize the meaning of arithmetical vocabulary, instead
of using, e.g. the (second-order) Dedekind Axioms. In the case of subtle neo-Fregeans, on
the other hand, I can see a motivation. Hume’s Principle, and abstraction principles more
generally, might be thought to be important because they are seen as capturing the dif-
ference between setting forth a mere quantified biconditional as an implicit definition of
mathematical terms:
∀α∀β(f(α) = f(β)↔ R(α, β))
and setting forth the corresponding ‘just is’-statement:
f(α) = f(β) ≡α,β R(α, β).
And this is clearly an important difference. Only the latter delivers subtle Platonism,
and only the latter promises to deliver an account for the special epistemic status of
mathematical truths.
If that’s what’s intended, however, it seems to me that there are better ways of doing
the job. Consider the case of Hume’s Principle. In order to convince oneself that it succeeds
in characterizing the meaning of our arithmetical vocabulary, one needs to prove a certain
kind of completeness result: one needs to show that setting forth Hume’s Principle as an
implicit definition of numerical terms is enough to pin down the truth-conditions of every
arithmetical sentence one wishes to have available for use. This, in turn, involves proving
the following two results:
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1. Given suitable definitions, every true sentence in the language of pure arithmetic is
a logical consequence of Hume’s Principle.
[This result has come to be known as Frege’s Theorem. It was originally proved in
Frege (1893 and 1903), by making what Heck (1993) identified as a non-essential use
of Basic Law V. That the result could be established without using Basic Law V was
noted in Parsons (1965) and proved in Wright (1983).]
2. Given suitable definitions, every true sentence in the (two-sorted) language of applied
arithmetic is a logical consequence of Hume’s Principle, together with the set of true
sentences containing no arithmetical vocabulary.
Both of these results are true, but neither of them is trivial.
Now suppose that one characterizes the meaning of arithmetical vocabulary by using
the compositional semantics in appendix A. The assignment of truth-conditions one gets
is exactly the same as the one one would get by setting forth the ‘just is’-statement corre-
sponding to Hume’s Principle as an implicit definition of arithmetical terms—but with the
advantage that establishing completeness, in the relevant sense, turns out to be absolutely
straightforward. One can simply read it off from one’s semantic clauses. (In fact, the
easiest method I know of for proving the second of the two results above, and thereby es-
tablishing the completeness of Hume’s Principle, proceeds via the appendix A semantics.)
None of this should come as a surprise. When one uses the method in the appendix to
specify truth-conditions for arithmetical sentences one avails oneself of all the advantages
of a compositional semantics. Not so when one sets forth Hume’s Principle as an implicit
definition.
There is, however, a much more important reason for preferring the method in the
appendix over specifications of truth-conditions based on abstraction principles. Neo-
Fregeans have found it difficult to identify abstraction principles that can do for set-
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theory what Hume’s Principle does for arithmetic. (For a selection of relevant literature,
see Cook (2007); see also contributions to this volume by Cook, and by Shapiro and
Uzquiano.) But if one waives the requirement that the meaning-fixation work be done by
abstraction principles, the difficulties vanish. The subtle Platonist has a straightforward
way of specifying a compositional assignment of truth-conditions to set-theretic sentences.
(See appendix B for details.) As in the case of arithmetic, one gets the result that every
consequence of the standard set-theoretic axioms has well-defined truth-conditions. And,
as in the case of arithmetic, one gets subtle Platonism. In particular, it is a consequence of
the semantics that for the set of Romans to contain Julius Caesar just is for Julius Caesar
to be a Roman.
Perhaps there is some other reason to insist on using abstraction principles to fix the
meanings of set-theoretic terms. But if the motivation is simply to secure subtle Platonism,
it seems to me that neo-Fregeans would do better by using a compositional semantics
instead.
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A A Semantics for the Language of Arithmetic
Consider a two-sorted first-order language with identity, L. It contains arithmetical vari-
ables (‘n1’, ‘n2’, . . .), constants (‘0’) and function-letters (‘S’, ‘+’ and ‘×’), and non-arithmetical
variables (‘x1’, ‘x2’, . . .), constants (‘Caesar’ and ‘Earth’) and predicate-letters (‘Human(. . . )’
and ‘Planet(. . . )’). In addition, L has been enriched with the function-letter ‘#v(. . .)’ which
takes a first-order predicate in its single argument-place to form a first-order arithmetical
term (as in ‘#x1(Planet(x1))’, which is read ‘the number of the planets’).
If σ is a variable assignment and w is a world, truth and denotation in L relative to σ
and w can be characterized as follows:
Denotation of arithmetical terms:
1. δσ,w(pniq) = σ(pniq)
2. δσ,w(‘0’) = 0
3. δσ,w(pS(t)q) = δσ,w(t) + 1
4. δσ,w(p(t1 + t2)q) = δσ,w(t1) + δσ,w(t2)
5. δσ,w(p(t1 × t2)q) = δσ,w(t1)× δσ,w(t2)
6. δσ,w(p#xi(φ(xi))q) = the number of zs such that Sat(pφ(xi)q, σz/pxiq, w)
7. δσ,w(p#ni(φ(ni))q) = the number of ms such that Sat(pφ(ni)q, σm/pniq, w)
Denotation of non-arithmetical terms:
1. δσ,w(pxiq) = σ(pxiq)
2. δσ,w(‘Caesar’) = Julius Caesar
3. δσ,w(‘Earth’) = the planet Earth
22
Satisfaction:
Where p[φ]wq is read pit is true at w that φq,
1. Sat(pt1 = t2q, σ, w)↔ δσ,w(t1) = δσ,w(t2) (for t1, t2 arithmetical terms)
2. Sat(pt1 = t2q, σ, w)↔ [δσ,w(t1) = δσ,w(t2)]w (for t1, t2 non-arithmetical terms)
3. Sat(pHuman(t)q, σ, w)↔ [δσ,w(t) is human]w (for t a non-arithmetical term)
4. Sat(pPlanet(t)q, σ, w)↔ [δσ,w(t) is a planet]w (for t a non-arithmetical term)
5. Sat(p∃ni φq, σ, w)↔ there is a number m such that Sat(φ, σm/pniq, w)
6. Sat(p∃xi φq, σ, w)↔ there is a z such that ([∃y(y = z)]w ∧ Sat(φ, σz/pxiq, w))
7. Sat(pφ ∧ ψq, σ, w)↔ Sat(φ, σ, w) ∧ Sat(ψ, σ, w)
8. Sat(p¬φq, σ, w)↔ ¬Sat(φ, σ, w)
Philosophical comment:
As argued in the main text, a sentence’s truth-conditions can be modeled by a set of
consistent scenarios. Accordingly, when w is taken to range over consistent scenarios—as is
intended above—the characterization of truth at w yields a specification of truth-conditions
for every sentence in the language.
The proposed semantics makes full use of arithmetical vocabulary. So it can only be
used to explain the truth-conditions of arithmetical sentences to someone who is already
in a position to use arithmetical vocabulary. What then is the point of the exercise? How
is it an improvement over a homophonic specification of truth-conditions?
The first thing to note is that the present proposal has consequences that a homophonic
specification lacks. Conspicuously, a homophonic specification would be compatible with
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both traditional and subtle Platonism, but the present proposal is only compatible with
subtle Platonism (since it entails that there is no consistent scenario with no numbers).
And unlike a homophonic specification, the present proposal can be used to go from the
assumption that every sentence in the purely mathematical fragment of one’s metalanguage
is either true or false to the assumption that every sentence in the purely mathematical
fragment of the object-language is either necessarily true or necessarily false.
The reason the present proposal has non-trivial consequences is that mathematical vo-
cabulary never occurs within the scope of ‘[. . .]w’. So even though mathematical vocabulary
is used to specify the satisfaction clauses, the worlds in the range of w can be characterized
entirely in non-mathematical terms. As a result, the formal semantics establishes a con-
nection between mathematical and non-mathematical descriptions of the world. It entails,
for example, that the consistent scenarios at which the number of the planets is eight are
precisely the consistent scenarios at which there are eight planets—from which it follows
that for the number of the planets to be eight just is for there to be eight planets.
Why not make this connection more explicit still? Why not specify a translation-
function that maps each arithmetical sentence φ to a sentence φ? such that (i) φ? contains
no mathematical vocabulary and (ii) the subtle Platonist would accept pφ ≡ φ?q? Al-
though doing so would certainly be desirable, it is provably beyond our reach: one can
show that no such function is finitely specifiable. (See Rayo (2008) for details.)
Technical comments:
1. Throughout the definition of dentation and satisfaction I assume that the range of
the metalinguistic variables includes merely possible objects. This is a device to
simplify the exposition, and could be avoided by appeal to the technique described
in Rayo (2008) and Rayo (typescript ).
2. In clause 5 of the definition of satisfaction I assume that ‘number’ includes infinite
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numbers. This is done in order to ensure that there are no empty terms in the
language. If one wanted to restrict one’s attention to the natural numbers one could
do so by working in a free logic.
B A Semantics for the Language of Set-Theory
Consider a two-sorted first-order language with identity, L. It contains set-theoretic vari-
ables (‘α1’, ‘α2’, . . .), and non-set-theoretic variables (‘x1’, ‘x2’, . . .), and predicate-letters
(‘Human(. . . )’ and ‘Planet(. . . )’). If σ is a variable assignment and w is a world, truth in
L relative to σ and w can be characterized as follows:
1. Sat(pxi = xjq, σ, w)↔ [σ(pxiq) = σ(pxjq)]w
2. Sat(pxi ∈ αjq, σ, w)↔ σ(pxiq) ∈ σ(pαjq)
3. Sat(pαi ∈ αjq, σ, w)↔ σ(pαiq) ∈ σ(pαjq)
4. Sat(pHuman(xi)q, σ, w)↔ [σ(pxiq) is human]w
5. Sat(pPlanet(xi)q, σ, w)↔ [σ(pxiq) is a planet]w
6. Sat(p∃αi φq, σ, w)↔ there is a set β such that (Goodw(β) ∧ Sat(φ, σβ/pxiq, w))
7. Sat(p∃xi φq, σ, w)↔ there is a z such that ([∃y(y = z)]w ∧ Sat(φ, σz/pxiq, w))
8. Sat(pφ ∧ ψq, σ, w)↔ Sat(φ, σ, w) ∧ Sat(ψ, σ, w)
9. Sat(p¬φq, σ, w)↔ ¬Sat(φ, σ, w)
where a set is goodw just in case it occurs at some stage of the iterative hierarchy built up
from objects x such that [Urelement(x)]w. (For philosophical and technical comments, see
appendix A.)
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